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he size of cartel overcharges: 
Implications for u.s. and 
EU fining policies 
By JOHN M. CONNOR & ROBERT H. LANDE* 
The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine 
levels of the European Union (EU) and the United States are at the opti-
mal levels. We collected and analyzed the available information concern-
ing the size of the overcharges caused by hard-core pricing fixing, bid 
rigging, and market allocation agreements. Data sets of United States car-
tels were assembled and examined. These cartels overcharged an aver-
age of 18% to 37%, depending upon the data set and methodology 
employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. 
Separate data sets for European cartels also were analyzed, which show 
overcharges in the 28% to 54% range. We similarly examined cartels 
that had effects solely within a single European country (which showed 
significantly lower overcharges, averaging in the 16% to 48% range). 
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In light of the desire for optimal deterrence, we compare the 
current fine levels in both the EU and the United States to the 
amounts gained on average by cartels as a result of their illegal 
activity. The results show that on average cartel overcharges are 
significantly larger than the resulting criminal fines of either the EU 
or the United States. This means that the United States and-
especially-the EU should increase their penalties for hard-core 
collusion substantially. 
I. INTRODUCTION: OPTIMAL DETERRENCE 
OF ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 
The generally accepted approach to deterring1 antitrust violations 
optimally was developed by Professor William Landes,2 who showed 
convincingly that the penalties (fines and damages) from an antitrust 
violation should be equal to the violation's "net harm to others"3 
For the standard optimal deterrence approach, see William M. Landes, 
Optimal Sanctions For Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652, 656 (1983). 
Professor Landes was not concerned with the compensation of victims. For an 
analysis that takes compensation into account, see Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust 
''Treble'' Damages Really Single Damages, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 161-68 (1993). 
Landes, supra note 1. Professor Landes built upon and applied to 
antitrust a framework developed in Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169 (1968). 
Professor Landes employed some reasonable simplifying 
assumptions. The logic underlying the "net harm to others" standard was 
explained dearly by Professors Breit & Elzinga: 
The trick to discovering the optimal sanction is to find a rule that will 
force the potential cartelist to compare any cost saving from his 
activity with the deadweight loss triangle. If the cost saving were 
larger than the deadweight loss, it would be in his (and society's) 
interest to undertake the illegal activity. So after he deducts the 
monopoly profit rectangle (which is only part of the fine to be paid 
under the Posner-Easterbrook rule), the cartelist will examine the 
deadweight loss (the remainder of the fine to be paid) and compare it 
with the value of the cost saving. The fine that is the sum of the 
deadweight triangle plus the profit rectangle is the correct sanction 
since it will encourage the "right" amount of illegal antitrust activity. 
Damages larger than this ... could lead to overdeterrence, for in that 
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divided by the probability of detection and proof of the violation.4 
Analysts of both the Chicago and post-Chicago schools of antitrust 
have almost universally accepted these principles.s 
The "net harm to others" from cartels of course includes the 
wealth transfers from consumers to the carte1,6 but it includes other, 
case the potential offender would be comparing the wrong 
magnitudes. After paying the trapezoid ... the remaining part of the 
fine to be paid would be compared with the cost saving from the 
illegal activity. If it is larger than that amount, the potential cartelist 
would be deterred from forming the cartel. But this would be 
incorrect from a social standpoint if the deadweight loss triangle were 
in fact less than the cost saving .... 
Therefore, the Posner-Easterbrook penalty causes the antitrust 
violator to compare any efficiency gains of the violation to the 
deadweight loss to society. The antitrust violator must be made to 
forgo his monopoly overcharge ... in order to give him the proper 
incentives to make the correct comparison. Only a fine equal to the 
total loss in consumers' surplus brings about this result. 
A numerical example may help to clarify the concept of the optimal 
antitrust sanction. Assume that a potential cartelist calculates that 
joining a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy will increase his profits by 
$100 million. He also is aware that the deadweight loss imposed on 
society by his activity is $50 million. If the expected value of the fine 
imposed is the entire amount of consumers' surplus ($150 million) 
would he enter the cartel? He would do so if he believed that the 
cartel would be accompanied by cost reductions to him gyeater than 
$50 million. If the cost saving were, say, $60 million, he would still 
enter the price-fixing conspiracy because he would know that his fine 
would be $100 million (his cartel profits) plus $50 million (the 
deadweight loss), leaving him $10 million more revenue than would 
be the case if he did not enter the cartel. In this case the cartel is 
accompanied by cost reductions gyeater than the deadweight loss it 
imposes on society. On efficiency gyounds, it should be permitted. 
WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM 11-12 (1986). 
See Landes, supra note 1, at 666-68. Thus, if the harm were 10 and the 
probability of detection and proof were one-third, the optimal penalty for this 
violation would be 30. This ignores risk aversion and other factors. See id. 
See the discussion in Lande, supra note 1, at 161-{i8. 
See Landes, supra note 1. 
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less obvious factors as well. First, market power produces allocative 
inefficiency-the deadweight loss welfare triangle7-that often is 
significant empiricallyB but apparently has never been awarded in an 
antitrust case.9 Second, market power can produce "umbrella" 
effects,lO another virtually una warded damage from market power. 
Moreover, cartel members may have less incentive to innovate or to 
offer as wide an array of nonprice variety or quality options.ll And, of 
course, all of a cartel's harms should be adjusted to present value.12 
These adjustments, combined, show that antitrust's so-called "treble 
See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 277-92 
(4th ed. 1982) (defining allocative inefficiency and providing a proof that it is 
created by monopoly pricing); MICHAEL L. KATZ & HARVEY S. ROSEN, MICROECO-
NOMICS 114 (3d ed. 1998). 
Frank Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445, 
455 (1985). Judge Easterbrook made a number of standard assumptions and 
calculated that the allocative inefficiency effects of market power were half as 
large as the transfer effects and that, due to the omission from damage 
awards of this factor alone, '''[tlreble damages' are really [onlyl double the 
starting point of overcharge plus allocative loss .... " Id. 
See David C. Hjelmfelt & Channing D. Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages 
For Consumer Welfare Loss, 39 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 505 (1991). We recently 
performed our own search and also did not find such a case. 
10 "Umbrella effects" is the name given to higher prices charged by non-
violating members that were permitted or caused by the violation's 
supracompetitive prices. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW 'II 337.3 (Supp. 1992). To illustrate, OPEC never produced even 
70% of the free world's supply of oil. See MOHAMMED E AHRARI, OPEC: THE 
FAILING GIANT 203 (1986). Yet, when OPEC raised prices, noncartel members 
also increased oil prices. Id. Moreover, the prices of fuels that were partial 
substitutes for oil, such as coal, uranium, and natural gas, also rose. See 
George L. Perry, The United States, in HIGHER OIL PRICES AND THE WORLD 
ECONOMY: THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM 102 (Edward R. Fried & Charles L. 
Schultze eds., 1975). Moreover, there are several additional types of harm that 
often are caused by cartels. See Lande, supra note 1, at 129-58. 
11 See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Implementing the Consumer 
Choice Approach to Antitrust, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2006). 
12 Studies suggest that the average cartel probably lasts seven to eight 
years, with an additional four-plus years lag before judgment. See Lande, 
supra note 1, at 130-34. 
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damages" remedy actually is roughly equal to one times an antitrust 
violation's "net harm to others."13 
Moreover, since not every cartel is detected or successfully 
proven, the "net harm to others" from cartels should be multiplied 
by a number that is larger than one (this multiplier should be the 
inverse of the probability of detection and proof).14 Of course, no 
one can be certain about the percentage of cartels that are detected 
and proven. In 1986 the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 
Douglas Ginsburg, opined that the enforcers detected no more than 
10% of all cartels. IS Other experts have suggested detection 
probabilities of 10% to 33%.16 It seems very likely that the Antitrust 
Division's amnesty program has resulted in the detection and proof 
today of a larger percentage of cartels than when Ginsburg made his 
estimateY We know of no evidence, however, that the current 
13 Id. at 158--60. This is a very rough approximation that does not include 
any adjustments for possible losses of innovation or diminished consumer 
choice. 
14 "Multiplication is essential to create optimal incentives for would-be 
violators when unlawful acts are not certain to be prosecuted successfully. 
Indeed, some multiplication is necessary even when most of the liability-
creating acts are open and notorious. The defendants may be able to conceal 
facts that are essential to liability." See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 455. 
15 See United States Sentencing Commission: Unpublished Public 
Hearings, 1986 volume (July 15, 1986 Hearing) at 15. 
16 See Peter C. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability 
of Getting Caught, 73 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 531 (1991) (finding a probability of 
13% to 17% for domestic U.s. cartels); R. M. Feinberg, The Enforcement and 
Effects of European Antitrust Policy: A Survey of Legal Opinion, 23 J. Co~V!o" 
MIcr. STUD. 373 (1985) (finding that cartel discovery is believed by European 
lawyers to be about 10%); Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The 
Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of the Law, 38 J EcoN. LIT. 45 (2000) 
(stating that for the most common felonious property crimes (burglary, auto 
theft, and arson) U.s. arrest rates vary from 13.8% to 16.5%); and Mark A. 
Cohen & David T. Scheffman, The Antitrust Sentencing Guideline: Is the 
Punishment Worth the Cost?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331, 342 (1989) (giving an 
illustration with a 33% probability of detection). 
17 See Cary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence, 69 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 
798,817-23 (2001). 
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probability of detection and proof exceeds 33%, and there certainly 
is evidence that, despite the enforcers' superb efforts, many cartels 
still operate. IB We can be virtually certain, however, that if the 
combined antitrust sanctions (including fines and damage payouts) 
total only one times the actual damages caused by the violation, 
firms are significantly undeterred from committing antitrust 
violations.19 
Since the publication of Becker's and Landes' classic articles, 
optimal deterrence theory has evolved.20 Most theories of optimal 
legal enforcement assume that the aim is maximization of social 
welfare, and this can lead to a number of interesting conclusions. For 
example, optimal enforcement may involve a combination of fines 
and imprisonment, but the latter is rare in Europe,21 Criminal law 
systems with extensive protections for the accused should have 
18 The continued high number of U.s. Department of Justice ("DOl") 
grand juries, and the recent DOJ success rate in the courts, is evidence that 
many cartels still exist. As of February 2004, the DOJ had approximately 100 
pending grand jury investigations, 50 of which involved suspected interna-
tional cartel activity. ANTITRUST DN., U.s. DEYT OF JUSTICE, STATUS REPoRT: AN 
OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION'S CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov / atr /public 
/guidelines/202531.htrn. Between 1993 and 2002, the DOJ opened from 19 to 
51 grand jury investigations per year, most of which resulted in convictions. 
ANTITRUST ON., U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE, WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY 1991-2002, available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/12848.htrn. Since 1995 the government 
has won more than 90% of such cases each year. If there was little or no effec-
tive price fixing during this period, the DOJ fooled a large number of grand 
juries, judges, and juries. 
19 Instead of attempting to ascertain the actual probability of detection 
and conviction, one could focus upon the perceptions of probable defendants. 
It would be extremely useful to know potential price fixers' perceptions of the 
probability that they would be caught and convicted of price fixing, and their 
belief as to how much they would be forced to pay. We know of no reliable 
information on this issue, however. 
20 See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa, Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON. 
SURVS. 267 (1997). 
21 Where prisons are expensive (as in Europe), fines may be preferred to 
imprisonment; for whatever reason the opposite often seems to be the case in 
the United States. 
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higher sanctions, and criminal cartel fines are in fact higher in North 
America. 22 Deterrence is enhanced by legal systems that punish 
conspiracies to commit crimes, even though the conspiracy may be 
ineffectual. Common law systems have long relied on conspiracy 
theories, and EU cartel enforcement has moved in that direction.23 
Private suits often can result in overall lower costs of public and 
private enforcement; again, this is long-standing practice in the 
United States and the direction in which the EU seems to be moving. 
These and other predictions from optimal deterrence theory have, 
however, received only limited empirical verification. 
In the United States and some other jurisdictions efforts to deter 
cartels are pursued by a combination of factors: private damage 
actions, and jail sentences and individual and corporate criminal fines 
for some types of antitrust violations. This article will focus only on 
the last of these types of sanctions: corporate criminal fines. We will 
not attempt to ascertain whether the other types of sanctions are at 
the appropriate level. 
II. VIEWS ON CARTEL DETERRENCE IN EUROPE 
European concepts of the philosophical foundation of the 
antitrust laws incorporate two principles.24 First, the retribution 
principle stresses that sanctions should be imposed on violators in 
proportion to the harm inflicted on the victims. In economic terms 
this means that antitrust fines and compensation should be related to 
22 Some scholars have taken the position that criminal proceedings are 
inherently superior in deterring cartels because there are likely to be fewer 
enforcement errors than in an EU-style administrative system. See Maarten 
Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra, Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement (Depart-
ment of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Working Paper, June 2004) (on 
file with the authors). 
23 Julian M. Joshua & Sarah Jordan, Combinations, Concerted Practices, and 
Cartels: Adopting the Concept of Conspiracy in European Community Competition 
Law, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 647 (2004). 
24 International Competition Network, Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, 
Effective Institutions, Effective Policies: Vol. 1: Report Prepared by the lCN 
Working Group on Cartels (Bonn, Germany June 2005), available at www 
.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. 
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the economic harm generated by the price fixing or other violation. 
Second, the utilitarian principle insists that society is best served 
when penalties are high enough to prevent recidivism, either by the 
perpetrator himself (special deterrence) or as an example to other 
would-be wrongdoers (general deterrence). 
The idea that deterrence of one type or another is the object of 
anticartel enforcement seems to be well accepted by European legal 
writers on cartellaws.25 Antitrust enforcement is seen as promoting 
societal welfare through organizational penalties that discouraged 
illegal future cartel formation. Less well accepted, however, is 
whether the victims of this illegal behavior should be compensated 
for their losses. 
III. CURRENT U.S. FINING PRACTICES 
The current criminal fines for cartels are established by Sentencing 
Guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(USSC).26 These Guidelines provide that the base fine level generally 
will be 20% of the "volume of affected commerce."27 The USSC's 
cartel fine levels, established in 1987 and in effect today, follow from 
its presumption "that the average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent 
of the selling price."28 The USSC doubled the 10% estimate to account 
for harm "inflicted upon consumers who are unable or for other 
reasons do not buy the product at the higher price."29 The 
Commission added: "The purpose for specifying a percent of the 
volume of commerce is to avoid the time and expense that would be 
required for the court to determine actual gain or 10ss."30 
25 Wouter P.J. Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Uzw the Answer?, 
28 WORLD COMPETITION 117 (2005); and CHRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA, 







U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1 (2005). 
Id. § 2Rl.1(d)(1). 
See U.s. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Rl.l, application note 3. 
Id. 
Id. 
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The USSC Guidelines start with a base fine of double the 10% 
presumed overcharge and adjust this by a number of factors, such as 
whether bid rigging31 or other aggravating factors are involved, and 
by mitigating factors as well.32 A complex series of adjustments result 
in the actual fine that is to be imposed on a cartel member. (These fines 
usually are adjusted downward for cooperation or as a part of the 
Antitrust Division's leniency program.33) As the Sixth Circuit noted, 
the USSC "opted for greater administrative convenience" instead of 
undertaking a specific inquiry into the actual loss in each case.34 
The USSC adopted the crucial 10% presumption because its use 
was advocated by the (then) head of the Antitrust Division, Douglas 
Ginsburg, who stated to the USSC that "price fixing typically results 
in price increases that has [sic] harmed the consumers in a range of 10 
percent of the price .... "35 While the record does not disclose how 
Ginsburg arrived at his 10% overcharge estimate,36 a prominent 
31 If bid rigging is involved, the Base Offense Level is increased by 1. See 
U.s. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1 (b). 
32 See id. § 2R1.1 and application note 1. 
33 See Spratling, supra note 17. 
34 See United States v. Hayter Oil Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1277 (1995) (''The 
offense levels are not based directly on the damage caused or profit made by 
the defendant because damages are difficult and time consuming to establish. 
The volume of commerce is an acceptable and more readily measurable 
substitute"). 
35 Douglas Ginsburg, Statement to the United States Sentencing 
Commission 13-14 (July IS, 1986). See United States Sentencing Commission: 
Unpublished Public Hearings, 1986 volume (July 15, 1986 Hearing) at 14. If 
Ginsburg was correct, damages for cartels should have been tenfold their 
damages. 
36 Interestingly, two economists at the Antitrust Division published an 
unusually thoughtful analysis of many of these issues at roughly the same 
time that Assistant Attorney General Ginsburg testified before the USSc. See 
Gregory J. Werden & Marilyn J. Simon, Why Price Fixers Should Go To Prison, 
32 ANrrrRUST BULL. 917 (1987). Included in this article was a tantalizingly brief 
survey of existing cases, and on this basis they concluded that a 
"[c]onservative estimate of the average price increase from price-fixing is 10 
percent." Id. at 924-25. Even though the article's first footnote cautions that 
the views in the article "are not purported to reflect those of the U.S. 
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analysis of this issue by Cohen and Scheffman37 published shortly 
after the antitrust Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated states 
that the economic evaluation of a very small number of price-fixing 
conspiracies was particularly important in shaping the conclusions of 
Ginsburg and the USSC that the overcharges from price-fixing 
conspiracies were approximately 10%.38 
The issue of whether the u.S. Sentencing Guidelines for cartels 
were set at the appropriate level to deter antitrust violations 
optimally is especially important in light of the recent Supreme Court 
decision in United States v. Booker.39 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Stevens held that finders of fact must determine beyond a reasonable 
doubt every contested fact that might increase a defendant's 
punishment.4o A separate opinion by Justice Breyer41 concluded that 
the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory instead of mandatory.42 
Although the effects of Booker on antitrust penalties are complex and 
Department of Justice," one cannot help but note that this is the same 
estimate that Ginsburg provided to the USSc. 
37 See Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 16. 
38 Id. at 344-45. 
39 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). A jury found the defendant guilty of possessing 
92.5 grams of crack, a crime for which the statute authorized a minimum 
sentence of 10 years and a maximum of life imprisonment, and for which the 
Sentencing Guidelines required the judge to select a base sentence between 210 
and 262 months. In a sentencing hearing, however, the judge determined by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams 
of crack and was guilty of obstructing justice. Therefore, the Guidelines 
required the judge to increase the sentence to between 360 months and life 
imprisonment. The judge sentenced Booker to 30 years. Id. A similar scenario 
occurred in the companion case, United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
40 The Court held that "the Constitution protects every criminal 
defendant 'against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.'" 
Booker at 748. The Court found that a judge may sentence a defendant based 
only on the facts "reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 
Id. at 749. A judge may not use any additional fact, other than a prior 
conviction, to increase the sentence. Id. 
41 Id. at 756. 
42 ld. at 764. 
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difficult to predict,43 under any plausible scenario the questions 
addressed by this article are likely to be of increasing importance. 
IV. CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU 
A. European Union cartel rules 
Until World War II the United States was nearly alone in the 
world in having a strong commitment to anticartel enforcement.44 
National laws outlawing price fixing were passed in the late 1940s in 
Japan and Germany as part of the occupation policies of the Allies to 
prevent the reappearance of concentrated economic and political 
power in those former Axis countries. The antitrust laws in Germany 
were strengthened just before the Treaty of Rome that created the 
European Economic Community (EEC) was signed in 1957. Beginning 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and increasingly so in the 1980s and 1990s,45 
the anticartellaws of the United States and the EEC (now part of the 
EU) became the world's two great legal templates.46 
Today the European Commission's (EC) Directorate-General for 
Competition (DG-COMP) is, like the U.S. Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division, one of the world's two most powerful anticartel 
enforcement authoritiesY Within DG-COMP a special anticartel unit 
43 See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise 
Prices? Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REv. 513 (2005). 
44 WYATT WELLS, ANrnRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD (2002). 
45 Harding and Joshua conclude that "European law has over 
[1980-1990] caught up with American law" in the sense that cartels are now 
subject to "categorical censure." HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 25, at 270. 
46 International Competition Network Report, supra note 24, at 14. The 
EEC was renamed the European Community by the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1993, which also created the EU. The European Community remains a 
distinct entity within the EU. 
47 In addition, the U.s. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) does file suit 
against cartels, but it refers "hard-core" collusion to the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) because violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act do not give 
rise to criminal penalties. 
The DG-COMP has about 500 professionals, roughly half that of the DOl's 
Antitrust Division. However, it has broader legal responsibilities (state subsidies, 
issuing negative clearances, etc.) than the Antitrust Division. Moreover, the 
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was created in the late 1990s, which has the power to demand 
information from potential violators in writing and to conduct on-
premise surprise inspections. 
In language not unlike that of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
Article 81 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits agreements and concerted 
acts in restraint of trade, when that trade is between member 
countries of the EU.48 All forms of naked cartel behavior are 
considered very serious infringements of EU competition rules. 
Significantly, however, allegations of price fixing are handled by the 
EC as an administrative proceeding; there is no concept of price fixing 
as a criminal justice matter under EU competition law. Unlike in the 
United States, EU law does not give rise to personal penalties for 
cartel activity. The EC maintains the fiction that its competition 
enforcement activities are not criminal actions, but rather 
punishments for violations of behavioral rules.49 
The administrative powers and procedures of DC-COMP resemble 
those of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission more closely than those of 
DOJ has available investigators from the FBI, whereas DG-COMP does its own 
probes. 
48 "Agreements" in EU parlance are roughly equivalent to overt 
conspiracies in the U.s. tradition: written or oral agreements or joint 
announcements about conditions of sales. "Concerted practices" are forms 
of business cooperation based on mutual understanding or exchange of 
information, i.e., tacit agreements. Like the interstate commerce clause of 
the U.s. Constitution, the EU's competition laws were designed to preserve 
the smooth functioning of a customs union that is evolving into a single 
market. 
49 Besides the United States and Canada, at least ten other countries 
have laws that provide for possible criminal sanctions: Israel, Austria, 
Germany, France, Norway, Ireland, Slovakia, Japan, the UK, and South 
Korea. It is not clear, however, that all of these jurisdictions have actually 
imposed criminal sanctions. However, for an analYSis of the Israeli floor tile 
cartel case, where Israeli businessmen served time in jail, see Scott D. 
Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement, 
Antitrust Division, U.s. Department of Justice, Charting New Waters In 
International Cartel Prosecutions, Twentieth Annual National Institute on 
White Collar Crime, ABA Criminal Justice Section, March 2, 2006, Section 
II(A)(2), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/214861.htm. 
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the 00].50 After a lengthy investigation that relies mainly on written 
documents, if there is probable cause the EC issues a Statement of 
Objections to the putative violators. The accused companies have the 
opportunity to reply in writing or in a brief oral hearing. If a violation 
is deemed to have occurred, a draft decision is circulated to a 
committee of experts for comments. The final decision must be 
approved by the Commissioner for Competition and voted on by the 
full Commission. Adverse EC decisions can involve enjoining conduct, 
voiding contracts, or fining corporate transgressors. Cases are judged 
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, unlike the criminal 
violations by cartels of United States antitrust laws, which must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Once issued, the EC decision often 
is appealed to the EU courts. The EC's cartel decisions take an average 
of three years after a formal investigation is opened.51 
EU legal thinking has begun to integrate the common law concept 
of conspiracy into its cartel prosecutions.52 In 1998 the EC issued 
guidelines for the calculation of price-fixing fines that governed and 
explained its practices.53 Moreover, in 1996 the EC issued its first 
corporate leniency notice, and the EC leniency policy was revised in 
2002 in a way that made it closely resemble the United States policy in 
this area. As in the United States, the EU's leniency program is a 
raging success; by early 2006 it was reported that DC-CaMP had a 
backlog of 80 approved cartel amnesty applications. 54 
50 Like the FTC, the DG-COMP investigates allegations of antitrust 
violations, holds hearings in which defendants can present their side of the 
case, makes an initial determination of guilt, recommends sanctions, has 
those decisions approved by the full Commission, and may have its decisions 
appealed by the guilty parties to two higher courts. 
51 John M. Connor, Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and 
Anticartel Enforcement (Dep't of Ag. Econ., Purdue University, Staff Paper 03-
12, November 2003), available at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin 
IpdC view Ipl?paperid=11506&ftype=.pdf. 
52 Since the 1970s "the classic price-fixing, market-sharing cartel has .. 
been driven underground and become strongly prohibited .... " Id. at 229. 
53 Id. at 242. 
54 Julian M. Joshua, Supermodels, Geeks, and Gumshoes: Forensic 
Economics in EC Cartel Investigations (Mar. 17, 2006) (paper prepared for the 
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Therefore, by the late 1990s the EU had also developed a set of 
government anticartel sanctions for corporations that were similar to 
those of the United States.55 The main differences are with respect to 
private damages suit and individual sanctions. EU law and the laws 
of many Member States do have provisions that allow compensatory 
private antitrust suits. Because of numerous procedural, evidentiary, 
and other impediments, however, a 2004 study found that few such 
suits had been filed.56 There is also an active debate as to whether EU 
competition law should be criminalized, and whether the individuals 
who organize and participate in cartels should be sent to jail.57 
B. Cartel sanctions in the EU 
Monetary fines are essentially the only sanction imposed by the 
EU on convicted corporate cartel participants. Like the United States, 
the EU has an upper limit on fines. In the United States the maximum 
fine is 80% of a defendant's U.S. "affected sales," that is, sales in the 
cartelized market during the entire conspiracy period.58 Although we 
are unaware of a sound empirical analysis of the issue, anecdotal 
Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics Conference on Forensic Economics 
in Competition Law Enforcement) (suggesting that the policy has produced 
"an embarrassment of riches" because its "plodding procedures" will make it 
forgo prosecution of pOSSibly more than half of the cartels). 
55 HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 25, at 216-22. 
56 See DENNIS WAELBROECK, DONALD SLATTER & GIL EVEN-SHOSHAN, STUDY ON 
THE CONDITIONS OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES IN CASE OF INFRINGEMENT OF EC 
COMPETITION RULES: COMPARATIVE REPORT ix (2004) (survey showing only 
around 60 cases for competition-law damages actions, all in national courts; 
of these apparently 12 were on the basis of EU law, 32 on the basis of national 
law, and 6 on both; 28 resulted in awards). 
57 See Wils, supra note 25. 
58 The DOJ recommends the maximum fine at 80% of sales in the United 
States, and U.s. courts may have the authority, so far untested, to calculate 
fines on the basis of 80% of global sales. Under an alternative statute used only 
when the proposed fine exceeds the statutory cap (i.e., $10 million from 1990 
to 2004, and $100 million after 2004), double the damages or double the gain 
can be imposed. For a discussion and citations, see Connor & Lande, supra 
note 43, at 524. 
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evidence suggests that the actual U.S. cartel fine percentages mostly 
fall in the 5% to 20% range. By contrast, the EU fine structure allows 
DC-COMP to recommend fines of up to 10% of a violator's global 
annual sales in all its product lines in the one year prior to the decision. 
For a sample of 63 cartels discovered from 1990 to 2005 operating 
inside the EU, the simple mean EU fine was 6.3% of EU affected sales: 
55% were 5% or lower, and 28% were in the 20% to 40% range. 59 
In January 1998 the EC issued its first set of sentencing guidelines 
for price-fixing violations.6o First, the EC considers the "gTavity" of the 
offense. Although a matter of discretion, hard-core cartels are usually 
placed in the "very serious" category, which is the highest of three 
levels of price-fixing infringements. Cartels with large damages that are 
geogTaphically widespread add to the gTavity. The fine calculations for 
the most serious infringements aim to result in a fine above (20 million. 
Second, to account for disparities in the power of fines to deter, 
relatively large companies are fined more than smaller participants: in 
several global cartels, companies in the upper half of the cartel's size 
distribution had their fines doubled. Third, fines are increased by 10 
percentage points per year for each year the cartel is effective. Fourth, 
these three factors result in a base fine (called a "basic amount") for 
each company that is adjusted for culpability; upward for cartel leaders 
and downward for various mitigating factors.61 Fifth, under the EO's 
leniency notice, violators are given 10% to 50% discounts for their 
59 See John M. Connor & Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private 
International Cartels (Purdue University Working Paper, 2006) (on file with the 
authors) (also showing that the mean fine/sales ratio is much lower for 29 
EU-only cartels and higher for 34 global cartels) and Penalties for Price-fixers 2 
CASENOTE, May 2006, www.casecon.com/data/pdfs/casenote41.pdf (finding 
that only 3% of 207 corporate cartelists from 1999 to 2004 had their EU fines 
reduced because of the 10% sales cap). 
60 Julian M. Joshua & Peter D. Camesasca, EC Fining Policy against Cartels 
after the Lysine Rulings: The Subtle Secrets of X, 5 GLOBAL COMPETITI00: REv. 5 
(2004) (arguing that, except for the lO%-of-sales cap, the guidelines essentially 
permit unfettered discretion by the EC in setting cartel fines). 
61 Similar to U.s. practice, mitigating factors include playing a purely 
passive role, non-implementation of the agreement, immediate termination 
after discovery, and good prior antitrust training programs. 
998 THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 51, No. 4/Winter 2006 
degrees of cooperation. In a few cases, full amnesty has been granted. 
Finally, after applying the last four steps, the EC ensures that the fine 
amount does not exceed 10% of global sales in the year prior to the date 
of the decision. Neither will it impose a fine that will bankrupt a firm. 
Although the EC's fines can be based on the global sales of an 
offending firm, in practice cartel fines tend to be correlated with a 
violator's EU sales in the affected line of business only.62 
European analysts have been critical of the EC's vast discretion in 
setting fines. 63 Large discounts have been awarded to companies that 
made low profits, were first time violators, and cooperated with the EC's 
investigation. There may be an unwritten rule that non-EU firms get 
lower reductions than those headquartered in the EU. EC Competition 
Commissioner Karl Van Miert rejected a U.S.-style point system as "too 
transparent" for violators.64 Perhaps most interesting was Van Miert's 
view that EC fines should be proportionately higher than parallel U.S. 
fines because Europe has no tradition of individual criminal liability-
neither individual fines nor jail sentences-for competition law offenses. 
This "U.S. plus" rule was applied to members of the lysine cartel in May 
2000, but since then has been applied inconsistently.65 
The 1998 cartel fining guidelines, for all their superficial rigor, are 
ultimately opaque and capricious.66 They were designed, in response 
to judicial criticism, to incorporate rules that varied fines according to 
the gravity, duration, and intentionality of the offense and 
62 JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING Table 3.1 (2d ed., forthcoming 
2007). 
63 VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND 
PRACTICE (I 997). See also Penalties for Price-fixers, supra note 59, at 2 (finding 
that "the [EU's] leniency programme appears overly generous" and that EU 
courts grant on average another 18% fine reduction upon appeal). 
64 Tim Alchin, Interview: Van Miert Sees EU Cartel Fines Exceeding U.S. 
Penalties, EXTEL EXAMINER (AFX) (September 8,1999). 
6S European Commission, Commission Decision of 7 June 2000 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement (COMP/36.545/F3-Amino Acids). Published in Brussels 7 June 2001 
in redacted form. 
See Joshua & Camesasca, supra note 60. 
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proportionality across violators. One of the EC's stated objectives is 
deterrence, but their Guidelines attempt to do this without directly 
using affected sales to calculate base fines. A primary reason why EC 
fines are unpredictable is that the number of euros chosen as the 
"start point" for the fine calculations appears to be almost arbitrary. 
That figure is supposed to be related to gravity (i.e., the nature of the 
offense, market impact, and geographic extent), but the figure is also 
increased for large companies, and is sometimes subject to a special 
multiple for "deterrence" for single companies. For example, in the 
Pre-Insulated Pipes cartel the starting-point amounts were €1 million 
for the firms in the smallest of four size categories and €20 million for 
the largest; in addition the largest firm was slapped with a 150% 
premium "for deterrence." Thus, the starting points for firms within 
the same cartel varied in a 50:1 ratio.67 
DG-COMP has an uneasy relationship with the EU courts that 
supervise its decisions, the Court of First Instance and the European 
Court of Justice. On appeal, from 1992 to 2005 these courts reduced the 
fines on more than 100 companies belonging to 13 cartels.68 The size 
and frequency of the reductions have increased over time. From the 
first successful appeal (Polypropylene in 1992) to 1998, only four appeals 
were successful, with reductions averaging 10%. But nine cartels were 
awarded mean reductions of 47% from 2000 to 2005. As a result, an 
increasing number of violators have been encouraged to appeal their 
67 Id. The rest of the calculation is mere arithmetic to account for 
duration, culpability factors, and leniency, plus a check that the final fine does 
not exceed 10% of sales. Moreover, even the worst offenders receive a 10% 
leniency discount for simply ceasing to collude after they were caught. Id. 
68 The authors examined EC press releases during this period. Small 
adjustments were made for miscalculations under the EC's fining guidelines 
for such things as the dates of the violations. The largest reductions were 
granted for procedural blunders: signatures by the wrong officials «(65 million 
in fines overturned), late submissions to the courts ((101 million), and failure to 
permit defendants to refute the evidence (€ 273 million). Court-mandated 
adjustments of cartel fines have always reduced, never increased the amounts 
imposed by the EC. The mean reduction in fines for the appellants was 57%; 
however, because not all members of the cartels appealed their fines, the mean 
reduction per cartel was 39%. Because these averages are strongly influenced 
by the total abrogation of fines for all 22 fined members of three cartels, the 
median reduction in fines per cartel is only 7%. 
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fines.69 Nevertheless, the fines meted out by the Ee for cases of price 
fixing reached an impressive total of more than $3 billion by 2005.70 
On June 28, 2006 the Ee revised its Guidelines for setting fines in 
competition cases, and the new Guideline levels are slated to go into 
effect for violations committed after September 2006.71 The revised 
Guidelines provide that, subject to the limit of 10% of worldwide 
turnover, companies may be fined up to 30% of their annual sales 
during the entire period of violation and that a 15% to 25% fine may 
be imposed no matter how short the duration of the cartel. In 
addition, repeat offenders are to be fined more than in the past; 
instead of a 50% increase, the Ee will impose a 100% increase for each 
prior offense. Its leniency policies are unaffected.72 It currently is 
unknown how much of an effective increase these new guidelines 
will cause. One analysis suggests that, if the fines had been applied to 
a sample of 57 fined cartel firms, although fines apparently would 
have been lower for 23 (40%) of the firms/offenders, on the average 
they would have slightly more than doubled.73 
C. Suits by private parties 
The Sherman Act has long provided that plaintiffs in successful 
private antitrust suits in the United States receive automatic treble 
69 Damian Geradin & David Henry, The EC Fining Policy for Violations of 
Competition Law: An Empirical Review of the Commission's Decisional Practice and 
the Community Courts' Judgments (Feb. 2005) (paper presented at the 
Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics Conference Remedies and 
Sanctions in Competition Policy), available at http://www.kernbureau.uva.nl 
/ acle / object.cfm/ objectid=F07DE744-Cl Dl-4F2E-876EEB31 F7F A5B9F. 
70 John M. Connor, Global Antitrust Prosecutions of Modern International 
Cartels, 4 J. OF INDUS., COMPETITION & TRADE 239~7 (2004). 
71 See http://ec.europa.eu.comm/ competition/ antitrust/legislation 
/fines/htrnl. 
72 See id. 
73 The study showed that on the whole they would have increased by 
a factor of 2.3. See New EU Penalty Guidelines: Will the 2006 penalty 
guidelines decrease fines? CASENOTE, July 2006, www.casecon.com 
/ data/pdfs/ casenote 43.pdf. 
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damages and reasonable attorneys' fees. 74 The idea of making injured 
companies or individuals into civil prosecutors was consistent with 
ancient traditions of English common law that were absorbed into 
American jurisprudence; yet, the United States is one of the few 
countries in the world to permit private citizens to prosecute antitrust 
violators for substantial compensation.75 
By specifying that plaintiffs should receive awards equal to triple 
the overcharges inflicted by defendants76 plus their legal fees, 
Congress intended that private parties inflict punitive sanctions on 
antitrust violators so as to deter those violators (specific deterrence) 
and also their potential imitators (general deterrence) from repeating 
their illegal behavior.?7 In addition, these awards apparently were 
intended to deny conspirators the fruits of their illegal conduct (the 
monopoly profits) and to compensate victims for overcharges on their 
purchases, the costs of investigating possible violations, the risks of 
nonrecovery, and their legal costs. Whether the current treble 
damages remedy really does all this adequately-especially in light of 
the fact that that the statute does not include prejudgment interest or 
74 HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTTIRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITs PRACTICE (1994). 
75 Since 1990 Australia, the U.K., and Canada have passed laws 
permitting private antitrust suits for single damages. So far, however, a 
number of serious procedural impediments, as well as the small size of the 
settlements approved by the courts of these countries, have discouraged most 
private civil suits. 
76 There is a lively debate in the law-and-economics literature over the 
desirability of treble damages suits. Papers published in the 1970s and 1980s 
expressed concern that treble damages would encourage buyers to delay 
suing price fixers in order to increase their legal recoveries-a perverse 
incentive. Other researchers have suggested "neutral" welfare consequences; 
that is, private suits result in pure income transfers with no social welfare 
impact. One of the latest words in this stream of the literature is David 
Besanko & Daniel F. Sperber, Are Treble Damages Neutral?, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 
870 (1990). Their game-theoretic model with apparently reasonable 
assumptions deduces that treble damages generally lead to positive welfare 
increases if the probability of conviction and the multiple of damages 
recovered is high enough. 
77 See Lande, supra note 1. 
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compensate for the allocative inefficiency harms or umbrella effects of 
market power-can certainly be questioned.78 
Even many of the most jaundiced observers of class actions 
concede that follow-on private actions are needed for deterrence.79 
Because the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs, because there is no 
prejudgment interest, and because most cases settle, single damages 
would in most cases have led to awards that were significantly less 
than the illegal profits obtained by the conspirators.80 Moreover, given 
that legal costs are typically 10% to 33% of the treble damage awards, 
plaintiffs would recover much less than their injuries had Congress 
specified that only single damages could be recovered. Treble 
damages are (hopefully) designed to be high enough to provide a 
reasonable incentive for private parties to bring suits that have 
significant deterrent effects, yet not be so large that they often would 
lead to frivolous suits or the use of antitrust suits to harass rivals. 
Complementary private suits in the national courts of the EU have 
been encouraged by decisions of the European Court of Justice since at 
least 1976, spurred in part because of low deterrence of cartels in 
Europe. Under EC Regulation 1/2003, national courts are authorized to 
use EU competition rules to award "damages to the victims of 
infringements."8! Nevertheless, a study commissioned by the EC found 
that private antitrust litigation is "totally undeveloped" in the Eo.82 
78 See id. 
79 Donald 1. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish 
Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 693 (2001). See also Donald 1. 
Baker, Revisiting History-What We Have Learned about Private Antitrust 
Enforcement that We Would Recommend to Others (Feb. 26, 2004) 
(unpublished article, on file with author). 
80 Legal practice does not allow defendants to subtract the extra costs 
associated with operating a cartel from the extra profits made. Nor can the 
fines and damage awards be counted as costs of doing business for income 
tax purposes. 
81 Gregory P. Olsen, Enhancing Private Antitrust Litigation in the EU, 
ANTITRUST, Fall 2005, at 73. 
82 ASHURST, STUDY ON THE CONDmONS FOR CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH 
OF COMPETITION RULES IN EUROPE (2004), http://ec.europa.eu/cornrn/competition 
/ antitrust/ others/ actions_for_damages/ comparative_report_clean_en.pdf. 
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Obstacles to this route include the inability of private parties to obtain 
evidence gathered by the DG-COMP (unless published), the "loser 
pays legal fees" rule, the lack of effective class action procedures, and 
disappointingly small damages awards. Although U.s. law has 
clearly inspired EU antitrust in many respects, the adoption of treble 
damages seems unlikely at this juncture. Perhaps the most likely 
scenario is that the U.K. or Ireland, jurisdictions with generous 
discovery rules, will become the legal fora of choice for EU plaintiffs. 
The absence of private suits is one of the main reasons that the EU 
antitrust system underdeters carte1s.83 
v. PRIOR COMPILA nONS OF STUDIES 
OF CARTEL PRICE EFFECTS 
Unsurprisingly, many analysts have studied the price effects of 
individual cartels. Several authors have even undertaken limited 
surveys of this literature, the best known of which was undertaken by 
Judge Posner. Posner analyzed the social costs of cartelization by 
assembling data on 12 "well-organized (mainly international) private 
cartels."84 He noted that "[s]uch estimates enable us to derive a crude 
and probably exaggerated, but nonetheless suggestive idea of the 
potential benefits of antitrust policy.''8S The studies yield a median 
cartel overcharge of 38% and an average cartel overcharge of 49.1 %.86 
Several other high quality surveys have been done, including a 
notable survey of collusion cases by Greg Werden,87 a survey by two 
83 John M. Connor, Effectiveness of Sanctions on Modern International 
Cartels (2006) (draft manuscript on file with the author). 
84 RiCHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 303-04 (2d ed. 2001). Judge Posner 
later explained that "these 12 were the best examples I found of well-
organized cartels, with the requisite data. If there are other well-organized 
cartels with the data needed to compute the cartel price increases I 
overlooked them." E-mail from Judge Richard A. Posner to John M. Connor 
(Feb. 2, 2004) (on file with author). 
85 POSNER, supra note 84, at 304. 
86 The low overcharge was 7% and the high was 100%. 
87 Gregory J. Werden, TIle Effect of Antitrust Policy on Consumer Welfare: 
Wiwt Crandall and Winston Overlook, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 
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of the profession's most active cartel researchers, Levenstein and 
Suslow,88 and a larger survey by Professor Griffin.89 The most 
authoritative of these was in 2003 by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Their report on "hard-core" 
cartels contains the results of a survey of their government-members 
on the economic harm caused by cartels recently prosecuted by the 
Table 1 
Summary of Seven Economic Surveys of Cartel Overcharges 
Reference Number of Average Overcharge 
Cartels Mean Median 
Percent 
1. Cohen and Scheffrnan (1989) 5-7 7.7-10.8 7.8-14.0 
2. Werden (2003) 13 21 18 
3. Posner (2001) 12 49 38 
4. Levenstein and Suslow (2002) 22 43 44.5 
5. Griffin (1989), private cartels 38 46 44 
6. OECD (2003), excluding peaks 12 15.75 12.75 
Total, simple average 102-104 30.7 28.1 
Total, weighted average 102-104 36.7 34.6 
30-2, January 2003. His sample selection criteria suggest why his results are lower 
than those obtained by Posner: 'The studies reviewed here examine criminally 
prosecuted cartels in existence after enactment of the felony provisions of the 
Shennan Act in late 1974. The price effects of cartels at earlier times may have 
been substantially different because sanctions were less severe." ld. 
88 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel 
Success? (U. Mich. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 02-001, Jan. 21, 2002), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/ so13 / papers.cfm?abstract_id=299415. However, 
the article's estimates appear to include some peak, rather than average 
figures, so the median and mean figures may be somewhat high. 
89 James M. Griffin, Previous Cartel Experience: Any Lessons for OPEC?, in 
ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: AN ECLECTIC APPROACH (Lawrence R. Klein 
& J. Marquez eds., 1989). We eliminated from his survey the episodes that 
were government-sponsored and therefore not the subject of this article. 
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EC or by OECD members' national antitrust authorities.90 For the results 
of these surveys see table 1. 
Despite these prior surveys, there does indeed seem to be a broad 
consensus among legal and economic writers that the question of the 
optimality of price-fixing penalties turns mightily on the actual 
degree of harm caused by cartel conduct, and that we do not know 
enough about this issue. 
VI. A GENERAL SURVEY OF OVERCHARGE STUDIES 
In our quest to find case studies of the effects of cartels on price 
we examined scores of refereed journal articles, working papers, 
monographs, and books that analyzed cartel price effects, many of 
which are peer-reviewed studies by economists.91 Other sources 
include antitrust agencies, parliamentary inquiries, and 
multilateral organizations.92 We aimed at collecting the largest 
possible body of information on the subject, eschewing all but the 
most minimal subjective quality screening.93 We excluded from our 
90 OECD, REpORT ON lliE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD-CORE CARTELS AND 
SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS UNDER NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS, Annex A 
(2003). Our presentation of these results in table 1 excluded four of the survey 
results because they almost surely are peak figures (i.e., price increases "up to 
50%") instead of averages results. Id. at 9. In addition, one of the results was 
"more than 14%," but we figured it at 14%. Id. at 22. 
91 These studies vary substantially in terms of depth, professional 
orientation, and date of publication. We utilized 82 peer-reviewed journal 
articles, many of which contained multiple estimates. The second most 
frequent source of estimates was the 55 books or chapters in books. For 
details on sources and calculation methods, see John M. Connor, Price-Fixing 
Overcharges, available at http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/ staff / connor 
/papers/PRICE_FIXING_OVERCHARGES_APPENDIX_TABLES_8-05.pdf. 
92 We have made every attempt to identify and collect all useful 
information on private cartel overcharges available from public sources. 
Because of this article's antitrust orientation, commodity agreements 
sponsored or protected by national sovereignty are not included because they 
would tend to bias upward the overcharges in our sample. In general we 
aimed to follow procedures that result in conservative results. 
93 Consistent with most previous studies of cartel effectiveness, we treat 
each cartel episode as a unique observation. Most cartels are organized and 
1006 THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 51, No. 4/Winter 2006 
survey cartels that were established or actively supported by 
governmental action. 
We found 845 useful estimates of cartel overcharges or 
undercharges in nearly 200 publications that analyzed cartels that 
operated in 234 markets. Of these cartels, 36% were created by 
international agreements,94 almost one-third were bid-rigging schemes, 
and about 60% of the cartelists were found guilty by an antitrust 
authority.95 We were able to collect and analyze 674 of these estimates.96 
A. Results of the survey 
The overcharge estimates are presented in table 2, divided into 
periods that, broadly speaking, represent different antitrust regimes 
in the United States and abroad.97 The median cartel overcharge for 
all types and time periods (a median that includes a significant 
fall apart only once, not counting brief disciplinary price wars. This describes 
one episode. However, many cartels are formed, disband, reform, and 
disband several times; each distinct cycle is considered an episode. Each time 
a new collusive episode begins, chances are that the methods and 
membership composition have changed. 
94 "International" describes the membership composition of the cartel, 
not necessarily the geographic spread of the cartel's effects. Some 
international cartels affected directly the commerce of only one nation, 
though the vast majority were international in both senses. 
95 Some cartels form, disband, and re-form many years later in the same 
market. Each formation is counted as a separate "episode." If a cartel was 
found guilty for only one of its multiple episodes, it was categorized as 
"guilty" for its entire existence. 
96 Researchers usually reported the average price increases over the 
whole episode, and these are the type we have analyzed. The remaining price 
observations were considered peak price effects. Generally speaking, the 
peaks were at least 50% higher and typically were more than double the 
average price enhancement achieved. 
97 For an explanation of why the particular dates and periods were 
chosen, see Connor & Lande, supra note 43. We choose to show the median 
overcharge percentages because the data are positively skewed. In such 
situations the means are larger than the medians, and the median is a better 
representation of central tendency. 
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number of zeros) is 25%.98 There is a downward trend in the cartel 
mark-ups over time for most cartel types.99 However, for two types of 
cartels, bid rigging and unsanctioned, there is no significant decline in 
average overcharges. While the causes of the downtrends in 
profitability for most types of cartels are uncertain, the influence of 
the spread of effective anticartel enforcement is perhaps the most 
obvious explanation. The greater antitrust scrutiny in the United 
States from the 1940s, and the increasing scrutiny in Europe since the 
1960s, could have prompted cartelists to refrain from full monopoly 
pricing increases so as to reduce the chances of detection. loo 
A second pattern that emerges in table 2 is that in every period 
international cartels have been more injurious than domestic (mostly 
U.s.-based) cartels. In general, international cartels are about 75% 
more effective in raising prices than domestic or "national" cartels. lOl 
98 The successful cartels (those with nonzero overcharges) had median 
average 28-29% overcharges. 
99 The correlations over time for the national and international cartels 
are -0.61 and -0.64, respectively. 
100 There is an overall upward trend in number of observations per year. 
The primary factor that explains the trend is the growth in the number of 
international cartels with usable data. The proportion of international 
schemes is especially high during the interwar period and after 1990. A 
second important trend is that the most recent cartel data arise from 
prosecuted cartels. Prior to 1946 fewer than 30% of our observations refer to 
cartels known to have been prosecuted. After 1990, 90% of the cartels in our 
sample were prosecuted or fined by one or more antitrust authority. This 
pattern does not necessarily mean that the probability of discovery by 
prosecuting bodies has gone up significantly, but it probably does represent a 
heightened aggressiveness in anticartel enforcement as well as a shift in 
research methods by social scientists. A third trend is the increasing 
prominence of estimates derived from bid-rigging conspiracies; after 1973, 
half of the episodes involved rigged bids. Relatively few international cartels 
rely primarily on rigging auctions or tenders for public projects. 
101 This is not so surprising in the pre-World War II era because 
international cartels were formed without concern about prosecution, and 
even in the interwar period U.s. companies may have believed that they had 
structured their participation in ways that would not run afoul of the 
Sherman Act. But the fact that the differences persisted in the postwar period 
is somewhat unexpected. 
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The clearly greater price effectiveness demonstrated by international 
agreements may reflect a greater degree of freedom from threat of 
entry by competitors than would be true for the geographically more 
localized cartels. 
Table 2 
Median of Average Cartel Overcharges, by Year and Type 
Cartel Episode Membership Legal Status Bid-Rigging All 
End Date National Inter- Found Legal Primary Other Types 
national Guilty Conduct 
Median Percent* 
1780-1891 22 41 32 22 16 24 23.5 
1891-1919 21 48 25 35 28 37 30.4 
1920-1945 18 36-37 45 32 34 34 34.0 
1946-1973 14 26 13 23 13 15 15.0 
1974-1990 18-20 40-43 22 37 21 25-26 24.0 
1991-2004 17-18 25 24-25 20 22 25 24.0 
All Years 17-19 30-33 23-25 28 21 25-29 25.0 
Medians of the lower bounds or the upper bounds of ranges, where appropriate. 
Includes many zero estimates. 
SOURCE: Connor, Price Fixing Overcharges, infra note 103, Table 6. 
The cartels from which we collected the data on overcharges 
functioned over various geographic areas. Some confined their 
operations to one nation, some to several countries in one continent, 
and some straddled continents (the last we refer to as global). The 
results show that those managed in single European countries have 
the lowest median overcharges (17%) but, curiously, those 
organized across national boundaries in Western Europe were as a 
group the most successful (43% median overcharge). North 
American conspiracies also had quite low average overcharges 
(21 %). Median overcharges for Asian-based and global conspiracies 
were high (29%). 
A third finding is the lower price effects of bid-rigging cartels 
(median 21 %) compared to conventional conspiracies that set selling 
CARTEL OVERCHARGES 1009 
prices or allocated market shares (25-29%). Bid rigging occurs mostly 
in national or local conspiracies, so this finding may be confounded 
with the geographic types just discussed above.102 Nevertheless, this 
finding directly contradicts the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that 
impose higher penalties for bid rigging. It also challenges a rationale 
of the United States' overt policy shift in the 1980s that made bid-
rigging conspiracies a higher priority. 
Moreover, it is striking that 79% of the overcharges were above 
the 10% presumption that is the cornerstone of the Sentencing 
Guidelines. Indeed, 60% of the cartel episodes had overcharges 
above 20%. If the Guidelines' fines are supposed to be large enough 
to deter future antitrust violations, they are clearly far too low for 
the task. 
B. Reliability of studies 
Three approaches were taken to assess the reliability of the 
various overcharge estimates reported in the previous section. First, 
confidence in the estimates may be judged in part by the sources 
from which the overcharge estimates were derived. The majority of 
the estimates are drawn from the traditional end-product outlets of 
academic research: books and book chapters. The peer-reviewed 
journals account for 65% of the total and appear to report slightly 
lower overcharges.103 The majority of the government reports (4% of 
the estimates) were authored by civil servants with specialized 
training in economics, and typically these reports would be vetted by 
a panel of experts. In total, four-fifths of the estimates are drawn from 
102 When two variables are positively correlated with the variable of 
interest (in the present case average overcharges), it is statistically often 
difficult or impossible to disentangle their separate impacts. This condition is 
referred to as confounding. 
103 See Connor & Lande, supra note 43, at 546-47. See also John M. Connor, 
Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence (Dep't of Ag. Econ., 
Purdue University, Staff Paper 04-16, November 2004), available at 
http://agecon.lib.urnn.edu/cgi-bin/pdC view. pI ?paperid= 16093&ftype=. pdf; 
and John M. Connor & Yuliya Bolotova, A Meta-Analysis of Cartel Overcizarges, 
lNr'L J. OF INDus. ORG. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com 
I soB I papers.cfm?abstract_ id=788884. 
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the formal or informal writings of academic social scientists, and most 
of the remainder were the products of professionally trained 
individuals subject to the checks and balances of internal reviews. 
Courts and competition law commissions accounted for 12% of the 
estimates. 
Second, we examined whether there are systematic differences 
between the average overcharges across time, using the date of 
publication of the study as a proxy for analytical advances. The 
intuition here is that the authors of more recent empirical studies of 
cartels have learned to avoid the methodological pitfalls of their 
predecessors.104 The results show that it is not clear that the level of 
overcharges varies systematically over time.IOS 
The third check on reliability of estimates across various 
analytical methods controls for changes in the composition of the 
sample by focusing on pairs of estimates applied to identical cartel 
episodes. There are 291 pairs of observations available for this 
analysis of reliability, which examines 6 general methods of 
estimation. I06 By and large, different authors and different methods 
104 Among the economic studies that dominate the sample, there is an 
undeniable trend away from mere narrative historical case studies, 
sometimes embellished with simple graphical illustrations, towards more 
formal statistical modeling. In industrial economics there is a trend away 
from evaluating cartels from the point of view of the theory of pure 
monopoly toward a more sophisticated and nuanced view informed by game 
theory and other conceptual advances. The results of a temporal analysis are 
displayed in Connor & Lande, supra note 43, at 540-44, and Connor, supra 
note 103. 
105 It is true that correlations of overcharges over time do show 
down trends for some types of cartels, but this trend could be confounded 
with a greater proportion of peer-reviewed publications in current research. 
106 The most widely used is the so-called before-and-after method in 
which the price during the episode is compared to one of three "but for" or 
base prices. The second most popular method is statistical modeling, which 
accounts for 20% of the estimates. The yardstick method accounts for about 
10% of the sample. Overcharges derived from costs of production or profits 
are the least frequently employed method (about 3%). Sixth, approximately 
10% of this article's estimates are quotes from or interpretations of decisions 
made by antitrust authorities. 
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applied to identical cartel episodes do not result in markedly different 
estirnates.l°7 
VII. CARTEL OVERCHARGES ACROSS 
GEOGRAPHIC AREAS 
Do cartels that have fixed prices in various parts of the world vary 
in their abilities to raise prices? Do global (multicontinental) cartels 
achieve overcharges different from those of more localized conspiracies? 
The answers to these questions may be of interest to antitrust 
enforcement officials because of the implications for cartel deterrence. 
Figure 1 and table 3 classify cartels according to the location of the 
cartel's headquarters or the place of residence of the great majority of 
the cartel's corporate members. In most cases the corporate 
membership mix corresponds to a cartel's geographic field of 
operations.108 Geographic classification is usually straightforward, but 
requires judgment in some cases. Cartels may be composed of 
member companies with headquarters in only one country or one 
continent; in most of these cases the cartel is a "virtual" joint venture 
with no permanent address. On the other hand, many early twentieth 
century cartels established secretariats with professional staffs in 
London, Zurich, or similar locations. In more recent decades trade 
associations or management consulting firms have assisted with 
cartel operation. In these cases the geographic locus is easy to 
107 Nevertheless, there are some differences. The before-and-after method 
produces cartel-overcharge estimates that are quite a bit higher than an 
econometric model applied to the same data. What this result seems to suggest 
is that authors of traditional before-and-after analyses are failing to adjust for 
all the competitive factors that might drive up the competitive benchmark 
price. Second, compared with before-and-after, the cost-based and yardstick 
techniques yield relatively high overcharge estimates. This suggests that the 
methods that use costs or profits fail to fully account for all competitive 
industry costs, omitting perhaps those related to product marketing or 
overhead, or that indirect geographic spillovers from cartel activity may be 
more common than most analysts anticipate. If the yardsticks are product 
substitutes, analysts may have underestimated quality differences. 
108 The major exception is export cartels, which are categorized in their 
country or region of origin but set prices in the "rest of the world." 
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identify. Cartels with corporate members from multiple regions are 
more difficult to classify, but if a supramajority of the companies 
were headquartered in North America, Western Europe, or Asia, the 
cartel is categorized in one continent. Global cartels are those with a 
diverse mixture ot' participants from two or more continentS; nearly 
all global cartels aimed at controlling prices in at least Western 
Europe, North America, and East Asia. 
Figure 1 










* Spreadsheet dated August 2005. 
Table 3 
Global Other North Nations of 
America Europe 
Average Overcharges by Cartel Headquarters Location 




USA and Canada 234 20.25 28.53 
Single nations in W. Europe 136 16.95 47.98 
Multiple nations in W. Europe (EU) 126 42.70 53.66 
Asia and Oceania 53 28.80 52.69 
Global 248 28.00 50.24 
Africa, So. America, & E. Europe 23 18.80 23.89 
SOURCE: Total of 770 observations from Connor, Price Fixing Overcharges. supra note 91, 
Appendix Table 2. 
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There are some significant differences in average cartel 
overcharges across geographic regions. Those that operated across 
multiple Western European countries109 have the highest overcharges 
but, curiously, those organized within national boundaries of 
countries in Western Europe were as a group the least successful. 
North American conspiracies also resulted in lower overcharges than 
those that operated across multiple Western European countries. llo 
Median overcharges for global conspiracies were relatively high.lll 
Approximately one-third of the 770 average overcharges collected 
are derived from reports of decisions of courts, commissions, and other 
government antitrust authorities. Government investigations began in 
the nineteenth century with commissions and committee reports 
authorized by the u.s. Congyess, the British Parliament, the German 
Diet, and perhaps similar bodies in other countries, but none of these 
reports have been found to contain quantitative overcharges. u.s. courts 
began to issue opinions on cartels in the late 1890s, and as antitrust laws 
began to be adopted in other jurisdictions, more decisions about cartels 
were issued. While only a minor portion of these decisions contained 
usable data on overcharges, the total number of overcharge 
observations accelerated in the late twentieth century. As a result, more 
than half the estimates are derived from decisions issued after 1990. The 
next section reports on a survey of final decisions of U.S. courts. 
VIII. SURVEY OF FINAL U.S. VERDICTS 
IN CARTEL CASESll2 
The amount that prices changed is not relevant to the issue of 
whether a cartel violated the antitrust laws. ll3 It therefore is 
109 In the past few decades, these correspond to intra-EU international cartels. 
110 Connor and Bolotova confirm that North American cartels and those 
operating within Western European nations as a whole have significantly 
lower overcharges. See Connor & Bolotova, supra note 103. 
m When this analysis is repeated using post-1989 data, the ranking 
remains the same but the differences are smaller. 
112 This section is based upon Connor & Lande, supra note 43. 
113 See LAWRENCE A. SULliVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: 
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 165-233 (2000). 
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unnecessary for the court in criminal antitrust cases to calculate the 
extent of any overcharges or undercharges.1l4 In private civil cases, 
however, the damages awarded to a successful plaintiff are equal to 
three times the overcharges,1l5 so plaintiff must demonstrate how 
much prices increased due to the violation. 
It has been extremely difficult, however, to locate final verdicts 
because almost every private antitrust suit settles or is dismissed 
before an overcharge can be calculated by a neutral observer and 
made part of the public record of the case. As a consequence, final 
verdicts involving cartels where a judge, jury, or commission 
calculated an overcharge are surprisingly rare. 
Settlements, moreover, are an extremely unreliable guide as to the 
size of the underlying cases' overcharges.116 Settlements are by no 
means likely to be compromises for half of the overcharges.117 For 
114 Normally the government simply relies upon the 10% overcharge 
presumption. On this basis the prosecutors and the defendants typically settle 
upon a criminal fine without calculating the actual overcharges involved. For 
a rare exception, see United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1999 U.s. Dist. 
LEXIS 9655, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1999), in which defendants were convicted 
of conspiring to fix the price and allocate the sales of lysine. 
115 15 U.S.c. § 15 (Supp. 1992). 
116 One might believe, for example, that a settlement represents the lower 
bound of the expected recovery if the case went go to trial (the present value 
of three times the overcharge plus attorneys' fees) since a risk-neutral 
defendant would be unlikely to settle for the entire expected verdict. One 
might also believe the supposed rule of thumb that good antitrust cases 
usually settle for single damages, perhaps on the dubious theory that the 
trebling (which produces a higher number) and the lack of prejudgment 
interest (which produces a lower number) would usually roughly cancel one 
another out. We have no evidence as to whether this is the way that plaintiffs 
and defendants, or their attorneys, typically behave. We have, however, 
heard trustworthy plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys tell us, anecdotally, 
that they have settled cartel cases for single damages. 
117 If plaintiff and defendant each had, and knew that they had, a 50% 
chance of winning, then the settlement might well be for 50% of the present 
value of the automatically trebled overcharges. But this would not be true if 
plaintiff's chance of prevailing was not 50%, if one party was a better 
bargainer, or if parties were unduly optimistic or pessimistic about their 
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example, a risk-averse plaintiff with a strong case might settle for 
very little if he or she needs the money quickly.118 Conversely, a risk-
averse defendant with a strong case might settle for what might seem 
like an overly generous amount to avoid even a small probability that 
an irrational judge or jury will award an amount large enough to 
cripple the company.ll9 We do not believe that analysis based upon 
settlements would be meaningful. 
We instead attempted to obtain the largest possible sample of 
verdicts in collusion cases. We searched for fina1I20 decisions in 
United States antitrust cases involving horizontal collusion, broadly 
defined to include naked price fixing, bid rigging and divisions of 
chances of prevailing. If plaintiff has only a 25% chance of obtaining class 
certification and subsequently proving the damages, a settlement should be 
at far below the level of 50% of the discounted present value of three times 
the overcharges. 
118 Plaintiffs' counsel typically assert that defense counsel are able to find 
barely ethical ways to delay meritorious claims for years. Since antitrust 
awards do not contain prejudgment interest, 15 U.s.c. § 15, and plaintiffs 
often need the money in the short term, these delays harm plaintiffs' 
bargaining position significantly. Plaintiffs' counsel also assert that 
defendants often are able to unreasonably prevent the necessary class 
certifications, and otherwise to make litigation so burdensome that plaintiffs 
have to settle for only a small fraction of the actual overcharges. 
119 The authors have heard variations on this theme many times. 
Attorneys for defendants in cases that have settled for many millions of 
dollars appear to believe, well after the cases were over and there was no 
longer any threat of further liability, that their clients never affected prices. 
Defendants' attorneys often assert that their clients (who were found by a 
court to have agreed to fix prices) were prevented by market forces from 
affecting prices significantly. However, rather than take the risk of having a 
judge or jury not believe them, they settle for a large sum. 
Another factor that can make defendants want to settle even if they did 
not raise prices is antitrust's joint and several liability doctrine, which makes 
every member of a cartel liable for the overcharges of the entire cartel. This 
can lead to extremely large potential damages, and even a small risk of a 
huge payout can, from the defendant's perspective, overshadow a weak 
liability case. A defendant might be forced to settle for a significant amount 
even if it did not cause prices to be elevated. 
120 We excluded cases overturned on appeal. 
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markets, where a judge, jury, or commission calculated damages that 
could be expressed in percentage terms.121 
We were able to find only 25 final cartel verdicts,122 a small sample 
but one roughly as large as the various surveys reported in table 1 
(which reported 5-7, 12, 12, 13, 22, and 38 cases). Nevertheless, due to 
the sample's small size, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
These 25 final verdicts had a median average overcharge of 21.6% 
and a mean average overcharge of 30.0%.123 All but five found that the 
cartel had raised prices by more than the USSC's 10% benchmark. 
How useful are the decisions of judges and juries in answering the 
question of how high cartels raise prices? While the common law 
system of jury and judge verdicts is far from perfect, it is the system 
we have chosen to use in a wide variety of life and death decisions 
affecting our society. Since the United States long has continued to 
use this system,124 our nation has made an implicit decision that 
judges and juries are the best way to arrive at the truth the largest 
percentage of the time. We know of no way to prove whether judges 
or juries achieve results better than those of the economists who 
publish studies in journals and books. We are using this survey of 
final verdicts to supplement the more comprehensive survey reported 
in sections VI and VIII. Since our two major approaches reinforce one 
another, the credibility of each is strengthened. 
121 Many of the verdicts were only expressed in dollar amounts that we 
were unable to translate into percentages, so we reluctantly had to omit these 
cases. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.s. 390 
(1906); Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. N. Am. Petroleum, 736 F. Supp. 511 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (1979). 
122 We surely found only a small percentage of final verdicts and would 
be gyateful if readers of this article could inform us, at rlande@Ubalt.edu, of 
final verdicts that we have inadvertently omitted. 
123 The nine cases that reported peak overcharges produce a median peak 
overcharge of 71.4% and a mean peak overcharge of 130%. 
124 In other nations with admirable judicial systems, judges or judicial 
panels are the vehicles of decisionrnaking in antitrust cases, which are typically 
civil matters. See, e.g., the discussion of the EU approach in MARC V AN DER 
WOUDE & CHRISTOPHER JONES, EC COMPETITION LAW HANDBOOK 593-629 (2003). 
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IX. OVERCHARGE CALCULATIONS DERIVED FROM 
DECISIONS OF THE EU, EUROPEAN NATIONS, 
THE U.S., AND OTHER ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES 
Figure 2 and table 4 combine the overcharges from the U.S. court 
survey presented above with published overcharge estimates that were 
derived from cartel decisions by other antitrust authorities,125 There are 
248 such observations-38% from analyses of guilty findings of U.S. and 
Canadian courts, 26% from decisions of the EC that imposed fines, 22% 
from commissions of European nations, and most of the rest from Asian 
antitrust authorities. Texts of most of these decisions can be found on the 
Web sites of the authorities or in various searchable law archives.l26 In 
some cases press releases or press summaries from the authorities 
contained sufficient information to calculate an overcharge, but more 
commonly an analyst used the product and geographic market definition 
and conspiracy dates in the opinion and applied this information to prices 
from a third party to calculate an estimate. As in the case of U.s. final 
verdicts, only a small minority of available decisions contain the 
appropriate quantitative data.l27 As was not the case with the previously 
reported sample of final verdicts in U.S. collusion cases, however, these 
results can most fairly be attributed to their analysts, not necessarily to 
the judges or other decisionmakers involved. 
125 The source of each of these estimates is shown in Connor, supra note 91, 
Appendix Table 2. In some cases the percentage overcharge was lifted 
directly from the decision, or the decision revealed market prices before, 
during and after the cartel's effective period. In other cases a monetary 
overcharge was available, and the author supplied an estimate of the affected 
sales. Occasionally, an antitrust authority provided overcharges in a survey 
of its own decisions. In a small number of cases the author's method is not 
described. Some decisions have multiple estimates provided by several 
authors. 
126 These sources include Lexis-Nexis, WestLaw, the Official Journal of 
the European Communities, and EUR-Lex. 
127 Guilty pleas and sentencing memoranda of the DOJ and Canadian 
Competition Bureau almost never mention damages. The EC has fined almost 
100 cartels since 1969, but the full decisions are not always published, and 
only a small number included price data. About 37 EC decisions yielded 
usable overcharges information. However, the Web sites of the Italian, 
French, Korean, and Taiwanese antitrust commissions contain the detail 
necessary in a large minority of cases. 
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The median overcharge in these cases is 23.5%, and the mean is 
43%; both figures are close to the results reported for the entire 
sample in section VI, supra, of 770 overcharge estimates. Besides the 
EC, a large number of observations come from decisions about mostly 
domestic schemes made by the U.K. Monopolies Commission in the 
1950s and 1960s. Most of the remaining decisions are from other 
commissions that typically fined international cartels discovered since 
1990. The estimated overcharges from decisions of the EU, Taiwanese, 
and Japanese authorities are relatively high. With few exceptions, 
overcharges from a jurisdiction are highly positively skewed. 
Three jurisdictions yield enough observations to examine changes 
over time. In each case, median overcharges from 1990 to 2005 are 
higher than from earlier periods. This increase is most likely 
attributable to the higher priority being given to prosecuting 
international cartels in the last 15 years. 
Figure 2 
A verage,...bvercharges from Courts and Commissions* 
No. America UK EU 




I- Median IiMean] 
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Table 4 
Cartel Overcharges from Decisions of Antitrust Authorities 
Antitrust Authority Number of Median Mean of 
Observations of Affected Affected 
Commerce Commerce 
Percent 
North America: 94 20.0 36.8 
US and Canada, pre-1990 55 18.5 38.7 
US and Canada, 1990-2005 39 21.6 34.0 
United Kingdom: 28 19.0 73.3 
UK Monopolies Commission 24 13.4 74.3 
UK,1990-2005 4 41.9 67.6 
Other European Nations: 26 18.8 22.8 
France 9 22.0 27.4 
Germany 4 11.0 12.0 
Italy 4 30.5 28.7 
Other Europe 9 9.0 20.5 
European Union: 64 27.5 35.0 
European Commission, pre-1990 11 25.0 31.7 
European Commission, 1990-2005 53 29.0 37.1 
China 2 21.1 21.1 
Japan FfC 10 28.4 26.3 
Taiwan FfC 8 67.5 94.9 
Korea FfC 13 20.0 29.4 
Australia 2 10.5 10.5 
Mexico 1 18.8 18.8 
Total 248 23.5 43.0 
SOURCE: Connor, Price Fixing Overcharges, supra note 91, Appendix Table 2. Several 
decisions have alternative estimates by single authors, and some have estimates by 
multiple authors. 
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X. CONCLUSIONS 
Both the EU and the United States have cartel fine levels that are 
far too low. Because only a small percentage of cartels are detected 
and proven, optimal deterrence theory prescribes that cartel fine 
levels should be significantly higher than the actual damages they 
cause. Cartel formation will be deterred ideally if the "net harm to 
others" from cartels is divided by their probability of detection and 
conviction, and the result is set equal to the fine level. For this 
reason the fines should be substantially more than the damages they 
cause. Yet, cartel penalties of both the United States and-
especially-of the EU probably do not even equal the damages that 
cartels cause. 
Our survey shows that United States' cartels have historically 
overcharged on the average between 18% and 37%, depending upon 
the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and whether 
mean or median figures are used. These results are generally 
consistent with the few, more limited, previously published works 
that survey cartel overcharges. l28 
However, the United States' cartel fine system starts with the 
presumption that cartels raise prices by 10% on average, and then 
adjusts it by a complex formula. 129 While these adjustments certainly 
can result in a fine higher than 10% of sales, often they result in a 
significantly lower figure. 130 However, if one-third of all United 
States cartels are detected and convicted, a fine level of three times 
U.S. overcharges, approximately 54% to 111 %, would be appropriate 
on average. Moreover, even fines set at this level would be 
insufficient because they do not adjust for the lack of prejudgment 
interest (cartel overcharges typically arise years before fines are 
128 The six studies we thought exhibited the highest standards of 
scholarship (table 1) report samples with simple average median overcharges 
of 28.1 % and simple average mean overcharges of 30.7% of affected sales. 
129 See section III supra. 
130 For a variety of reasons, few firms actually pay a fine amounting to 
10% (doubled) of the amount of commerce affected, especially if all figures 
are adjusted to constant dollars. Most violators have their fines reduced. See 
Spratling, supra note 17. 
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imposed131 ) or the other "net harms" of market power, such as the 
allocative inefficiency effects of market power.132 Of course, in some 
cases the effects of private treble damage actions133 and individual 
fines and jail time also should be considered. All told, the data 
suggest that the U.S. Sentencing Commission should raise the 
presumption that cartels raise prices by 10% to presumptions that 
domestic cartels raise prices by 15% and international cartels raise 
prices by 25%. Alternatively, if the policymakers decide that this 
distinction is unwise, a 20% overall presumption would be 
appropriate. The Guidelines also should include an adjustment that 
brings all overcharges and fines to their present value. 
The direction of the results for European cartels is the same, but 
unfortunately the EU fine levels are even lower on average than the 
United States fine levels. Our samples of European-wide cartels show 
average overcharges in the 28% to 54% range, depending upon the data 
set, methodology employed in the analysis, and whether mean or 
median figures are used. Cartels that had effects solely within a single 
European country overcharged significantly less on average, in the 16% 
to 48% range, again depending upon the data set, methodology, and 
whether mean or median figures are used. These figures are far above 
the European Union's cartel fines as a proportion of EU affected sales. 
131 Suppose a cartel overcharges in years one through seven, followed by 
discovery and another three years of litigation. The penalties would be 
assessed in year ten. The overcharges from year one should be adjusted for 
nine to ten years of inflation, but we have not done this. This omission means 
that our penalty recommendations are too low. 
132 There is an important respect in which this article's methodology has 
been conservative. It has focused solely on the public injury that arises from 
the transfer of income or wealth from purchasers to the cartel. As noted in 
section I, cartels also can lead to allocative inefficiency, umbrella effects, less 
innovation, managerial slack, and to nonprice harms to quality and variety. 
Yet, we have not taken these harms into account. Nor have we adjusted our 
results for inflation. Admittedly, some of these factors are difficult to 
measure. Nevertheless, while the Guidelines seem to have doubled the 10% 
presumption to account for these factors (see section I supra) we believe that 
this doubling has been overly conservative. 
133 However, on average private "treble" damages probably only 
constitute roughly single damages. See Lande, supra note 1. 
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The revised 2006 European fine levels134 almost certainly will 
prove to be higher on average in practice than the ones they replace, 
but they might actually be lower in a surprisingly large number of 
cases.13S And they still are subject to the ceiling of 10% of worldwide 
turnover for the preceding year. Crucially, they will only be a small 
fraction of their optimal size. For example, if one-third of European 
cartels are detected, if they last for five years on average, and if their 
overcharge is between 28% and 54% on average, then the optimal fine 
would be three times (28% to 54%) times five, or 420% to 810% of the 
annual sales of the convicted firm in the affected market. Yet, the total 
fine currently is limited to 10% of worldwide sales of the firm for the 
preceding year. 
There is no evidence suggesting that more than one-third of 
European cartels are detected. Yet, the other adjustments noted in the 
discussion of United States fine levels should be made for the 
European fines as well; they should be made to account suitably for 
the fact that the overcharges often occur years before the fine is paid, 
and for the other "net harms" of market power as well,136 Moreover, 
as noted earlier, the EU does not supplement its cartel fines with 
imprisonment and effective private enforcement. 
We therefore urge the EU to increase its cartel penalties 
dramatically: by an order of magnitude. We also urge the EU to enact 
legislation that facilitates the more widespread use of private antitrust 
actions, including class action cases, and to impose jail sentences on 
those who engage in hard-core collusion. 
134 See supra text accompanying note 71. 
135 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
136 These include the allocative inefficiency effects of market power and 
the umbrella effects of market power. See supra section 1. 
